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LIMITATION oF ACTioNs-CoNVERSION-Defendant purchased and went
into possession of land in 1944 at which time a logging donkey was upon the
land. The donkey had been on defendant's land without having been moved
or used since 1942. From 1944 to 1952 defendant made numerous inquiries
as to the ownership of the donkey without success. Through various conveyances, beginning in 1946, and without any transfer of possession, plaintiff
acquired title to the donkey in 1952. In May 1952, in order to further develop
his land, defendant sold the donkey. In a suit by plaintiff for conversion of
the donkey, the lower court ruled that the action was barred in 1945 by the
three-year statute of limitations. 1 On appeal, held, affirmed. Plaintiff's cause
of action accrued when the donkey came to rest on defendant's land, since the
title of the true owner was then reduced to a right of immediate possession or
to a cause of action in the event immediate possession was denied. 2 Jones v.
Jacobson, (Wash. 1954) 273 P. (2d) 979.
Statutes of limitations do not begin to run until plaintiff has a cause of
action that contains all the elements necessary to prosecute successfully such an
action. 3 The issue in cases involving statutes of limitations thus becomes one
of determining what elements constitute a particular action. A cause of action
in conversion accrues when the defendant has asserted such dominion over
property belonging to plaintiff as to be inconsistent with the rights of plaintiff,
or in derogation, exclusion, or defiance of such rights.4 Such acts therefore

1 Wash.
2 There

Rev. Code Ann. (1951) tit. 4, §4.16.080.
is some indication that the lower court ruled that the donkey had been aban-

doned. However, on appeal, this court proceeded on the as5\1mption that such an abandonment had not taken place.
3 Smith v. Seattle, 18 Wash. 484, 51 P. 1057 (1898); Strong v. Sunset Copper Co.,
9 Wash. (2d) 214, 144 P. (2d) 526 (1941).
4 Ashbrook v. Hammer, (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) 106 S.W. (2d) 776; Ray v. Pilgrim
Health & Life Ins. Co., 206 S.C. 344, 34 S.E. (2d) 218 (1945); Martin v. Sikes, 38
Wash. (2d) 274, 229 P. (2d) 546 (1951).
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may include a wrongful assertion of ownership as a denial of plaintiff's interest
in the property but in any event must include a wrongful deprivation of plaintiff's possessory interests. It follows from this that when defendant has come
into possession of plaintiff's property lawfully, a mere detention or failure to
deliver does not constitute a conversion, there being no assertion of defendant's,
or denial of plaintiff's, right in the property.5 Under such circumstances defendant, to raise a cause of action, must manifest some evidence of adverse
possession or must refuse delivery of possession on a demand by plaintiff.6
The evidence in the principal case indicates that defendant, prior to his sale
of the donkey, did not indicate any intent toward the property that was adverse
to the interest of the owner. By seeking out the true owner over a period
of eight years, he manifested his recognition of the true owner's title to the
property, and until the sale of the property was not guilty of a conversion.
The general rule is that where a demand is necessary to raise a cause of action,
the statute of limitations does not start running until such demand is made. 7
However, where the power to raise the cause of action is in the owner and he
is under no disabiHty, courts of equity have been unwilling to allow him to
defeat the policy of the statute of limitations by neglecting to make a demand.
Thus by in effect applying an equitable doctrine of laches, the statute of limitations will be held to have started to run within a reasonable time after the
owner could have made a demand. 8 What constitutes a reasonable time within
which a demand will have been presumed to have been made depends on the
circumstances but is usually held to be the period of the statute of limitations
for bringing the action. 9 The court in the principal case based its decision on the
finding that plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the chattel came to rest
on the land but at the same time admitted that such cause of action came
into being only in the event a request for immediate possession was denied.
Since no demand of the defendant was ever made,. the court had no basis for
5 Obviously, if defendant acquires possession by unlawful means, a cause of action for
conversion arises immediately and without further acts by plaintiff or defendant.
6 Clay County Abstract Co. v. McKay, 226 Ala. 394, 147 S. 407 (1933); Mueller
v. Technical Devices Corp., 8 N.J. 201, 84 A. (2d) 620 (1951); Lockit Cap Co. v. Globe
Mfg. Co., 158 Wash. 183, 290 P. 813 (1930); Hanson v. Ostrander Ry. & Timber Co.,
147 Wash. 104, 265 P. 159 (1928); Persson v. McKay Coal Co., 200 Wash. 75, 92 P.
(2d) ll08 (1939). The courts generally agree that where a demand by plaintiff would
be unavailing, it is not necessary to raise a cause of action. See Hochstetler v. Graber, 78
N.D. 90, 48 N.W. (2d) 15 (1951). If plaintiff had chosen to sue the present owner in
replevin, he would have been subject to the same requirement, i.e., a timely demand must
be made on a party who withholds possession lawfully. Edison Oyster Co. v. Pioneer
Oyster Co., 22 Wash. (2d) 616, 157 P. (2d) 302 (1945).
7Washington Security Co. v. State, 9 Wash. (2d) 197, ll4 P. (2d) 965 (1941);
First Mortgage Loan Co. v. Allwein, 186 Okla. 491, 98 P. (2d) 910 (1940); Wilson v.
Weber County, 100 Utah 141, lll P. (2d) 147 (1941); Kaplan v. Reid Bros., 104 Cal.
App. 268, 285 P. 868 (1930).
8 Gossard v. Gossard, (10th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) lll; Ilse v. Burgess, 28 Cal. App.
(2d) 654, 83 P. (2d) 527 (1938); Bell v. Brady, 346 Pa. 666, 31 A. (2d) 547 (1943).
See also 23 A.L.R. 10 (1923), 128 A.L.R. 158 (1940).
9 Ilse v. Burgess, note 8 supra; Fallon v. Fallon, 110 Minn. 213, 124 N.W. 994
(1910); Beard v. Citizen's Bank of Memphis, (Mo. 1931) 37 S.W. (2d) 678.
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holding that plaintiff had a good cause of action in conversion. The court's
seemingly contradictory language is a result of its determination to find some
basis for denying plaintiff his cause of action while at the same time recognizing
that a cause of action is necessary to start a statute of limitations running. The
court could have reached the same result by applying the !aches concept which
would estop plaintiff from denying that a demand and refusal was made when
defendant asserted the statute of limitations defense to plaintiff's suit in conversion. In this way, the court would have avoided the confusion and ambiguity that prevails in the principal case. Some have raised objections to such
an application of equitable estoppel on the grounds that defendant at all times
had it in his power to start the statute running by manifesting some indication
of adverse possession, and that until he did there could be no cause to start
the statute. However, if such were the law plaintiff by his laches could force
defendant to remain his in~oluntary bailee, a position that defendant could
avoid only by committing some act that would subject him to a suit for conversion. In addition to imposing all the risks and burdens attendant on such
a suit on the defendant, such a result would in effect be tantamount to requiring
an innocent party to become a wrongdoer in order to create rights against him
in another party who by his willful delay has avoided such rights. The equitable doctrine of !aches was developed to avoid anomalies and it should be
applied in cases where circumstances and policy warrant it.
Irving L. Halpern

